Netherlands to examine letting critical infrastructure operators take down unwanted drones

The Dutch government will examine whether operators of critical infrastructure, such as energy, telecoms or water facilities, should be allowed to take action against unauthorised drones themselves. It also plans to create a national drone detection database, with a first pilot in the Port of Rotterdam. The steps are part of wider European efforts to protect sensitive sites from unwanted drone activity.

What the industry proposed

The recommendations came from a Dutch resilience network coordinated by the Physical Living Environment Consultative Body (OFL). It brings together more than 50 organisations from energy, telecommunications, transport, water management and defence.

At present, only the police and the armed forces may intervene when an unwanted drone threatens critical infrastructure. Yet the organisations responsible for these sites are often the first to notice suspicious activity, and the time to respond may be only a few minutes. The network therefore urged the government to consider extra powers under specific circumstances and strict conditions. That would mean rethinking the view that the state's monopoly on the use of force must remain indivisible. The cabinet has accepted the recommendation and will study which measures operators could be allowed to take. No decision to grant such powers has been made.

National database and summit

The database is meant to combine information from different detection systems and locations. The Rotterdam pilot is due to start before the end of 2026. The government also wants to promote joint investment in detection equipment, data sharing and standardisation. A national drone summit has been announced to strengthen cooperation between government agencies and infrastructure operators.

Risks and the gap between sightings and incidents

Several European countries have reported suspicious drones in recent months, but it often remains unclear whether a drone was involved, who flew it or whether the intent was hostile. Earlier investigations found that some reports could not be substantiated or had other explanations.

Actively countering drones carries risks too. Electronic jamming can make a drone lose contact with its operator and crash uncontrollably, while other interception methods may endanger people, buildings and other airspace users. Legitimate flights could also be wrongly flagged as suspicious.

Remote ID

EASA, the EU Aviation Safety Agency, has proposed expanding Remote ID rules, including mandatory Direct Remote ID for drones over 100 grams, plus registration and extra training. Remote ID does not prove a flight is authorised, nor does it stop malicious operators from disabling or manipulating signals.